Category Archives: Litigation Mediation & Arbitration

Australia’s Proactive Arbitration Enforcement Regime: A Winning Formula

In recent years the Australian Courts have developed an enviable reputation for adopting a very proactive approach to the enforcement of both Australian and foreign arbitral awards. In particular, the Australian courts have adopted a vigorous approach in seeing off various challenges, many of them unmeritorious, trying to set aside arbitration awards on relatively spurious grounds such as alleged infringing public policy or procedural unfairness. In the process the Australian courts have made it clear that Australian governments both the Commonwealth government in Canberra and the various State governments regard arbitration as a beneficial form of prompt and efficient commercial dispute resolution which is to be encouraged and attempts to stymie arbitrations by unmeritorious challenges are unlikely to succeed in the Australian courts.

This approach has been demonstrated in a variety of cases most of them involving the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (the New York Convention) (NYC). These cases resulted in successful outcomes for the parties seeking to enforce their arbitral award with the enforcement proceedings often being concluded expeditiously and in some cases very expeditiously.

The enforcement of foreign arbitration awards in Australia and the conduct of international arbitration and award enforcement in Australia are governed by the Commonwealth International Arbitration Act 1974 (IAA). Domestic commercial arbitrations and the enforcement of their awards are governed by the Commercial Arbitration Acts of the various States such as the New South Wales Commercial Arbitration Act 2010 (CAA). A domestic award is one where both parties are Australian. An international award is one involving at least one non-Australian party. A foreign arbitral award is one made outside Australia.

Many of these pro arbitration award enforcement judgments have been handed down since 2010 when the IAA was amended and most of the State CAAs were substantially updated.

The IAA and the various State CAAs rely heavily on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (Model Law). The Model Law applies to international arbitrations conducted in Australia and is also heavily relied on in the CAAs. The IAA and CAAs, as well as the decisions of the courts in recent years especially after amendments to the IAA in 2010, give the Model Law the force of law in Australia and make it clear that the courts will use the Model Law as a template for the conduct of international and domestic commercial arbitrations. Indeed, the Australian courts have made it clear that they will endeavour to achieve harmonisation between the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards and international (including foreign) arbitral awards by utilising the provisions of the Model Law. A very good example of this approach was the decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Collin Joss & Co v Qube Furniture in 2015.

There are only a very small number of grounds enabling an award debtor to apply to a court in Australia to set aside an arbitral award. These grounds are largely procedural and are based on the grounds in article V of the NYC and include grounds such as breach of public policy, procedural unfairness, the absence of an actual agreement to arbitrate or the absence of a proper subject matter for arbitration. Interestingly the IAA has narrowed the public policy ground to apply only to awards induced or affected by fraud or corruption or where there is a breach of the rules of natural justice in the making of an award. The grounds for challenging enforcement of foreign awards are set out in section 8 of the IAA. Importantly section 39 of the IAA requires the enforcing court to have regard to the objects of the IAA and the fact that arbitration is an efficient, impartial, enforceful and timely method by which to resolve commercial disputes, and the awards are intended to provide certainty and finality. This legislative requirement has encouraged the Australian courts to adopt a proactive approach to arbitral award enforcement and to adopt a narrow approach to the grounds of setting aside awards where the party challenging the award has a significant evidentiary burden of proof albeit on the balance of probabilities. Amendments to the IAA in October 2015, although largely procedural, are likely to re-enforce these objectives.

As a consequence, the Australian courts are reluctant to intervene in arbitration and are content to leave the conduct of arbitration in the hands of the tribunal. This was demonstrated by the decision of the Federal Court in the 2015 case Sino Dragon v Noble Resources, in which the court declined to usurp the tribunal’s function of ordering disclosure of documents.

Nowhere has the proactive approach of the Australian courts to enforce foreign arbitral awards been better demonstrated than in the high profile enforcement proceedings which emerged during the 2015 Australian Grand Prix Formula One race involving a dispute in the week leading up to the race between one of the racing teams (Sauber Motorsport AG) and one of its drivers Giedo van der Garde. Mr van der Garde had obtained an arbitral award in Switzerland under the Swiss International Arbitration Rules after he had been removed from his position as a test driver for the Sauber team at the end of 2014. He alleged he had been offered a race seat for the 2015 season which Sauber disputed. The arbitral tribunal found for Mr Van der Garde. The award required Sauber to honour its contractual obligation to nominate Mr Van der Garde as one of their two race drivers for the forthcoming season. The award provided that Sauber must refrain from taking any action which would have the effect of depriving Mr Van der Garde his entitlement to participate in the 2015 Formula One racing season as one of Sauber’s two nominated racing drivers.

Sauber in the meantime contracted with two other drivers because they offered more sponsorship opportunity for Sauber. Not wanting to lose the sponsorship Sauber decided to prevent Mr Van der Garde from driving for Sauber.  Mr Van der Garde relied on the award to launch enforcement proceedings in the Victorian Supreme Court in March 2015, just days before the commencement of the race. As Australia and Switzerland are parties to the NYC (along with over 150 other countries) Mr Van der Garde’s award was enforceable as a foreign arbitral award under the IAA. The enforcement hearing took place on Monday, 9 March 2015 with the race scheduled to take place the following Sunday. Sauber put forward four reasons under section 8 of the IAA in support of their argument that the award should be set aside including that the award was outside the scope of the submission to arbitration, that the wording of the award involved too much uncertainty, that the award would jeopardise safety during the race because Mr Van der Garde had not driven a Sauber car during the 2015 season, and because the award adversely affected the rights of the two other drivers who were not parties to the arbitration, although they were granted leave to appear in the court proceedings. The primary judge made an order adopting the same wording as the award to enforce the award as a judgment of the court.

The Sauber team immediately launched an appeal against the order of the primary judge even though the first practice session of the race would begin in three days. In effect the appeal was a repeat of Sauber’s arguments before the primary judge. The appeal was heard very expeditiously by the Victorian Court of Appeal on Thursday, 12 March. The Court of Appeal dismissed Sauber’s appeal comprehensively. The Court of Appeal said that to establish that the enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy due to a breach of natural justice what must be shown is real unfairness and real practical injustice. The Court of Appeal said that errors of fact or law are not a legitimate basis for intervention in such cases. The Court of Appeal took the view that Sauber’s case to set aside the award was essentially a legal or factual argument “dressed up as a complaint about natural justice” which cannot be the subject to a valid objection to award enforcement. Similar findings and judicial comments have been made by other Australian courts in rejecting challenges seeking to set aside the enforcement of foreign (and Australian) arbitral awards).

The Court of Appeal rejected the alleged unsafe activity arguments mounted by Sauber on the basis that Formula One racing is highly regulated and the race organisers would ensure all safety requirements would be met, especially as nobody from the race organisers gave any independent evidence about the issue of safety. Sauber’s other arguments were also rejected.

As soon as the appeal was handed down in favour of Mr Van der Garde he launched contempt of court proceedings against Sauber. Tactically this was a very important step to take because it entitled him, if successful, to seize Sauber’s assets.

Not surprising this combination of the successful court orders enforcing the award in favour of Mr Van der Garde and the contempt proceedings led to the parties entering into commercial negotiations immediately. Overnight negotiations led to the contempt application being dropped and the team raced with considerable success on the Sunday with the two other drivers as it was apparent that Sauber had not proceeded with Mr Van der Garde’s driving application in time to allow him to race. Mr Van der Garde came out the real winner with his contract with Sauber being cancelled and he being reportedly paid the sum of approximately € 15 million to bring an end to his legal proceedings.

The Sauber case was an unusual application of the NYC and the IAA to bring finality to a bitter commercial dispute albeit in the sporting arena. However, it demonstrates the flexibility which Australian courts will be prepared to adopt to give effect to a foreign arbitral award where the court perceives that the objections to enforcement of the award are spurious and commercially motivated notwithstanding how much money and determination is thrown into the challenge to the enforcement of the award. The expedition with which the enforcement proceedings were conducted and concluded including the related contempt proceedings leading to a negotiated commercial compromise was quite remarkable in the circumstances and whilst this timeframe is atypical, it demonstrates that in the right case the Australian courts will move extremely quickly to enforce an arbitral award.

More typically enforcement of foreign (and for that matter Australian international and domestic) arbitral awards tend to involve more traditional commercial disputes such as those involving shipping, commodities, telecommunications, resources and investment projects. Arbitral awards handed down in Mongolia and Uganda as well as more traditional seats of arbitration such as London, Paris, Singapore and Hong Kong have been enforced by Australian courts despite the “usual” challenges alleging breach of public policy or some form of procedural unfairness. One unsuccessful challenger even alleged that the LMAA arbitrators in a London shipping arbitration were not “commercial” men as they were lawyers and hence the arbitration was invalid as the arbitration agreement called for arbitration by “commercial” men. The Federal Court rejected that challenge.

To support arbitration Australian courts have demonstrated their willingness to provide interim relief in the form of security such as freezing orders over assets held by an award debtor in Australia pending the outcome of award enforcement proceedings and in one case recently pending the determination of court proceedings in Singapore (see the judgment of the High Court in Bayan Resources v BCBC Singapore decided in 2015). The Australian courts emboldened by the clear legislative intent in the IAA, the Model Law, and the CAAs, will not lightly allow award debtors to escape enforcement and pending the conclusion of enforcement proceedings will stay any court proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement, may order security he provided by the award debtor both in Australia and on a worldwide basis and might require an overseas award debtor to provide security for costs for a challenge to enforcement of the foreign arbitral award in Australia. These are some of the remedies available in Australian courts at an interlocutory or final stage to give effect to Australia’s international obligations as enshrined in the IAA.

Australia is clearly a place where arbitration is favoured by the legislature and the judiciary as a desirable form of commercial dispute resolution, a trend which is only likely to increase. Australia’s recent adoption of many Free Trade Agreements with countries particularly in the Asia Pacific region is likely to see an increase in investor/state disputes being resolved in arbitration, including in the recently signed Trans Pacific Partnership where Australia is one of the 12 signatories.

Parties wishing to enforce arbitration agreements or enforce arbitration awards will find a willing ally in the Australia courts, whether the disputes are resolved in Australia or abroad or the awards are made abroad or in Australia. Either way Australia is a very good place to enforce your arbitration agreement or award. Unlike many jurisdictions the successful party to such proceedings in Australia will invariably be awarded its legal costs.

A Vintage Year for Hong Kong Arbitration

If anyone is wondering why Hong Kong enjoys such a great reputation as Asia’s premier hub for arbitrating international disputes, a simple review of arbitration activities over the past year should provide ample evidence. The courts, the executive arm of government and the members of the arbitration community have had an impressively productive year.

The Background: Good law, good judges, good institutions, good practitioners

 Hong Kong was one of the very first jurisdictions to adopt the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law; many seminal arbitration-related judgments have since issued from the Hong Kong courts. In 2011, Hong Kong again in the vanguard — among the first to adopt the amended version of the Model Law in its Arbitration Ordinance. The 2011 law is accessible and easy to navigate even for those unused to dealing with Hong Kong legislation. The Ordinance is self-contained, with all the material provisions contained within in one place. In addition to the classic Model Law provisions, Hong Kong’s law encourages arbitrators to proceed with diligence and without undue expense. It provides for the recognition and enforcement of interim measures ordered by arbitral tribunals sitting both in and outside Hong Kong. The courts are to intervene only when expressly authorised to do so, and in a supportive rather than a restrictive sense. The law recognises the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings, but also of arbitration-related court proceedings which are generally heard in camera unless the parties agree otherwise. An opt-in system, requested by representatives of the construction industry allows for consolidation of arbitrations by the court and for a limited right of appeal on a point of law.

Hong Kong judges, as will be clear below, complement the legislation with a keen sense of their role in supporting the arbitration process.  Hong Kong is a major hub for trade and finance, so it is no surprise to learn that its courts are crowded and delays can be severe. Judges, far from regarding arbitrators as usurping their work, welcome arbitration as relieving some of the pressure by taking often complex commercial cases out of the court system and resolving them privately. Judges respect the wishes of parties who have chosen this alternative outside the court, and they realise that it is in everyone’s interest to make the arbitration process work efficiently, without interference from the courts.

Hong Kong itself is strategically placed in the centre of Asia, an accessible and comfortable venue for both Asians and western partners. It is home to the award-winning Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, now celebrating 35 years of scholarship and service to the dispute resolution community and renowned for its first-class arbitrators, personnel and facilities for arbitration administration and hearings.  ICC Asia, the first “branch office” of the International Chamber of Commerce, was established in 1997; since 2007 parties have had the choice of initiating arbitration procedures in the Hong Kong office if it is more convenient for them than sending files to Paris.  In Hong Kong, over 1800 Asia members form the single largest contingent of the 14,000 members of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, providing training and qualifications to practitioners around the Asian region. The Hong Kong Institute of Arbitrators also trains practitioners and judges both in Hong Kong and in Mainland China. Arbitration Chambers is China’s first set of chambers dedicated to international arbitration, with tenants from around the world. CIETAC, China’s largest arbitration institution, has recently established a Hong Kong office to administer arbitrations.

All three of Hong Kong’s law schools offer graduate level degrees in arbitration and dispute resolution. The Vis East International Commercial Arbitration Moot[i], now in its 13th season, hosts over a thousand students, plus coaches and arbitration professionals from around the world each spring. The Vis Moot offers law students a unique opportunity to prepare and argue a realistic case before experienced arbitration lawyers and arbitrators, and to receive valuable feedback and practical advice over a week of hard work and hard partying. Aside from the enormous educational benefits, the Moot also fosters the development of international and intercultural understanding, cooperation and friendship. Mooties (both students and professionals) often return year after year, forging friendships and contacts which can last a lifetime.

The Arbitration News of 2015

The very first milestone of 2015 was the arrival of the newest version of CIETAC’s Arbitration Rules, which entered into force on January 1. In line with other modern rules the largest Chinese arbitration institution now provides for an Emergency Arbitrator procedure, a mechanism for the Secretariat to appoint an arbitrator in disputes involving multiple contracts, a power for CIETAC to consolidate proceedings, and for the joinder of third parties by the tribunal. Special provisions for arbitrations taking place in Hong Kong include the possibility for parties to name an arbitrator who is not on the CIETAC roster, as well as a separate pay scale for arbitrators sitting in Hong Kong. In an Appendix, the new Rules also deal with the fallout of the famous “schism” of the Shanghai and Shenzhen CIETAC offices. And the monetary limit for the summary procedure provided by article 56 of the CIETAC Rules is now increased to RMB 5 million.

In March the Hong Kong Court of Appeal decided that there could be no appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance refusing leave to appeal a decision ordering enforcement of a decision from Mainland China. The court found that there was a deliberate policy to restrict rights of appeal in arbitration-related cases, and confirmed the CFI decision.[ii]

In April, in the case of Ever Judger Holding Co. v Kromen Celik,[iii] the Court of First Instance issued the first anti-suit injunction, enjoining a claim for damaged cargo initiated in the Turkish courts, in breach of an agreement to arbitrate in Hong Kong contained in the relevant bills of lading.

On a different note, in May, when the Shanghai organisers of the 19th International Congress of Maritime Arbitrators were suddenly unable to complete preparations, the Hong Kong Maritime Arbitration Group and the HKIAC dramatically stepped in at the last minute to host several hundred delegates at a very successful meeting. As one of the busiest ports in Asia – and indeed, in the world — Hong Kong has no shortage of maritime experts.

In a rather unfortunate case in July[iv], Hong Kong Court of First Instance had to deal with competing jurisdiction clauses in a multi-contract dispute. In this case, the arbitration clause included the respondent’s counter-claim, but did not encompass the claimant’s original claim. The judge stayed the counter-claim in favour of arbitration, but found no legal basis to stay the claim. Observing that this solution could produce a potential “forensic nightmare” of parallel proceedings and potentially contradictory decisions, the judge did suggest as a case management solution that it would be “appropriate” for the claimant to delay its action until the arbitration case finished, to avoid duplication of efforts and resources and possibly inconsistent results.

The Court of Appeal spoke out once more in August, to uphold the constitutionality of section 81(4) of the Arbitration Ordinance in the face of a challenge. Section 81(4) provides that a party wishing to appeal from a CFI decision setting aside an award must first obtain leave to appeal from the CFI. The Court of Appeal had to decide who should be the “gatekeeper” controlling access to appeals. Recognising that, by leaving control with the CFI the provision did to some extent restrict the adjudicatory power of the Court of Final Appeal, the Court of Appeal nevertheless decided that the restriction was necessary to achieve legitimate aims (of minimising court intervention in arbitration) and was thus constitutionally valid.[v]

An application in September to set aside an enforcement order provided Justice Mimmie Chan with the opportunity to emphasise Hong Kong’s policy of minimal court intervention. Referring to the Hebei Import & Export v Polytek case of 1999 and the 2012 case of Grand Pacific Holdings v Pacific China Holdings, Justice Chan enunciated ten principles to be applied by Hong Kong courts in dealing with enforcement of awards:

  1. The court’s primary aim is to facilitate the arbitration and assist with enforcement.
  2. The court should intervene only as expressly provided by statute.
  3. Subject to public interest safeguards, parties should be free to settle their disputes as they see fit.
  4. Enforcement of awards should be “mechanistic” – almost a matter of administrative procedure.
  5. A party opposing enforcement must show a real risk of prejudice, and that its rights have been violated in a material way.
  6. The court is concerned with the integrity of the process; complaints must be serious or even egregious.
  7. In deciding whether to refuse enforcement the court does not look into the merits of the underlying transaction.
  8. Failure to make timely objection may constitute estoppel, waiver or lack of bona fides.
  9. Even if grounds are made out to refuse enforcement the court has discretion to enforce.
  10. Parties to arbitration have a duty of good faith.

Justice Chan then dismissed the application and ordered costs on an indemnity basis against the unsuccessful applicant, in keeping with Hong Kong’s now established practice.[vi]

On a lighter note

October saw Hong Kong hosting the second annual Hong Kong Arbitration Week, with six days of conferences and social activities organised by local firms and arbitration organisations as well as visitors such as the Spanish Commercial Arbitration Court (CIMA)[vii] of Madrid, and ArbitralWomen[viii], a Paris-based international dispute resolution network. During that week, the fourth annual Hong Kong Arbitration Charity Ball attracted some 600 revellers and raised over HK$1,200,000, mainly for the benefit of “Watchdog”, a local charity providing early educational services to children affected by autism, cerebral palsy or Downs’ Syndrome. Community service is yet another facet of the arbitration community of Hong Kong.

Creative financing for the future?

Also in October, just in time for Arbitration Week, Hong Kong’s Law Reform Commission unveiled a Consultation paper recommending that third party funding be allowed for arbitrations seated in Hong Kong. Hong Kong is not only a busy place for dispute resolution; it can also be prohibitively expensive.   Supporting its proposals as increasing access to justice, the authors of the Consultation paper pointed out that third parties could provide alternate sources of funding to claimants with legitimate claims, but who lacked the cash to pursue them. The paper included a study of current law and practices in England, Australia, Singapore, China and the US.

The Commission invites comments, by January of 2016, on topics including the possible legal framework for TPF, ethical and financial standards for funders, confidentiality and potential conflicts of interest, disclosure of TPF to the tribunal and to other parties, costs, a complaints procedure, and whether regulation should be by the government or self-regulation through an industry code of ethics.

To cap a great year, on November 20 the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre became the first and only international arbitration centre to establish an office in Mainland China. The new office in Shanghai is the second HKIAC outpost, the first being in Seoul. Speaking at the opening ceremony, Secretary for Justice   Rimsky Yuen said that the move would make Hong Kong’s first class arbitration services more accessible to those in the region.

Clearly, Hong Kong’s is a dynamic community focussed on its professional responsibilities. What sets it apart though, is that Hong Kong’s arbitration community is not content to rest on its laurels, but also possesses the vision to see the broader picture and to imagine the future. Hong Kong is, most definitely, a good place to arbitrate.

 

[i] See: www.cisgmoot.org

[ii] Guangdong Changshong Electric v Inspur [2015] 2 HKLRD 714

[iii] [2015] 3 HKC 246

[iv] CPC Construction v Harvest Engineering and anor (HCA 2096/2013)

[v] China International Fund Ltd v Dennis Lau (Secretary for Justice intervening) [2015] HKEC 1626

[vi] KB v S (HKCC 13/2015)

[vii] See: www.arbitrajecima.com

[viii] See: www.arbitralwomen.org

Why A Different Arbitration?

Why people resort to arbitration?

Bearing of course in mind that it is not possible to generalize, it is suggested that very frequently one resorts to arbitration because one looks at a dispute resolution mechanism which

  • be different from court proceedings (a remark which is more than obvious since otherwise one would stay with court proceedings)
  • and be better than it.

The choice of arbitration is then justified only if it provides a service which is better than the one provided by court proceedings.

Is generally arbitration better than court proceedings?

This comparison will be limited to four areas:

  • the composition of the arbitral tribunal
  • the remedies for a review of the decision
  • the taking of evidence
  • the duration.

The composition of the arbitral tribunal

Very frequently a panel of three arbitrations is selected, since one sees in this a tribute to symmetry and one may appoint “his” own arbitrator.

However, the result of this is that frequently in practice two arbitrators, out of a panel of three, are not always able to remain indifferent to the psychological pressure of their respective appointor.

Is this practice better than court proceedings?

The remedies for a review of the award

It is widespread that the remedy available against an award is only for procedural errors, excluding any review of the merits.

As a consequence, if the arbitral tribunal has erred in selecting the proper law, or has wrongly applied it, or has made errors as to the facts or wrongly appreciated the evidence, there is no remedy.

In court proceedings a full review of the merits, through a de novo rehearing of the case, is allowed and is generally considered as a fundamental right.

Is this practice then better than court proceedings?

The taking of evidence

In common law jurisdictions each party just calls her witnesses, examines them, then they are cross examined and possibly there is a redirect examination, the judge just supervising that this goes through properly.

In many civil law jurisdictions counsel must seek leave to call each witness, must submit the list of questions which he would like to be put to the witness and cannot examine the witness. The acceptance of his witnesses and of his proposals for questions and the actual examination of the witnesses is exclusively in the hands of the judge/or arbitrator who may, out of mere benevolence, allow counsel to put some but not too much questions.

In international arbitration, when the chairman comes from a civil law jurisdiction, the civil law system is more or less followed.

In any event, the parties are not placed in a position to know the rules of the game before starting it.

Is this practice better than court proceedings?

The duration

Some arbitrations last one year.

Others two years, several other ones three or more years.

In one case, in which I acted as counsel (and which ended up above any expectation by the client and by myself) it took 10 years.

Court proceedings frequently last – depending from the jurisdiction – between one and several years.

Is uncertainty about the duration of arbitral proceedings and signs that the arbitrator is very frequently quite relaxed and not disturbed by his/her duty to decide expeditiously better than court proceedings?

A different arbitration

It is suggested that this is not the arbitration which many parties look for, and that all such practices have to be corrected [1].

The European Court of Arbitration[2] has since 1997 Rules which provide for:

  • the appointment by its Nominating Committee of a sole arbitrator,
  • a duration of no more than 12-15 months, after which the arbitrator is functus ex officio,
  • an intra arbitration appellate proceedings, which provides for a full de novo review being conditional upon the deposit by the loser in the first arbitral proceedings of an amount, which in case of his loss of the proceedings will be paid by the Registrar to the victorious party the same day of the issue of the appellate award, and
  • the full right of counsel to examine and cross examine the witnesses[3].

This different arbitration has been described as a “fourth generation” arbitration.

[1] RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, International Arbitration – Law and Practice, Juris 2014.

[2] See www.cour-europe-arbitrage.org

[3] The Main Points of the Rules of the European Court of Arbitration.

Access to justice in clinical negligence cases … What access? What justice

The Government’s proposal to introduce a fixed costs regime for clinical negligence claims of up to £250,000 will almost certainly strike the death knell for access to justice for many negligently injured patients.

It had previously been assumed that fixed recoverable costs were only being considered for cases where damages are awarded up to £100,000. However, it is now proposed that the new fixed recoverable costs would apply to all cases in which the letter of claim is sent on or after 1 October 2016.

Health Minister Ben Gummer claims to want to reduce the £259m bill for legal fees which the NHS paid out over clinical negligence claims in 2013/14. He said: “Unscrupulously, some lawyers have used patient claims to load grossly excessive costs onto the NHS and charge far more than the patient receives in compensation.” This is unfair and potentially misleading.

While there is no denying that in some clinical negligence cases, the costs payable to the patient’s lawyers exceeds the level of compensation which the patient receives, there are key reasons why this is the case.

Clinical negligence cases are complex and it is a very specialised area of law. Each case is unique and presents difficult and challenging issues. Patients’ medical records are often extensive and require careful review. In addition, multiple reports from a number of experts in different, specialist fields are often required.

For example, I am currently dealing with a case on behalf of the widow of a 70 year old man who died as a result of alleged clinical negligence. His medical history is complex and includes previous surgeries to his heart and spine. Expert evidence has been required from an A&E specialist in relation to breach of duty and a Neurosurgeon, Radiologist, Intensive Care consultant and a Cardiologist regarding causation and loss.

In addition, the burden of proof is on the Claimant to establish breach of duty (that a negligent act or omission has occurred), causation (that the breach of duty has been causative of a worsening or deterioration in a patient’s outcome or condition) and the extent of the losses sustained. These highly complex cases require solicitors with many years of practicing experience in this area to ensure that the issues are properly investigated.

It is very difficult to see how a ‘one size fits all’, fixed cost regime can successfully work in this highly specialised area of law.

NHSLA conduct

The Department of Health’s criticism of the NHS’ legal bill makes no admission of the part it has played in driving up costs. Nearly all clinical negligence solicitors will have been faced with the situation where exhaustive attempts have been made to resolve a claim by way of negotiation prior to the commencement of Court proceedings but the NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA) has steadfastly refused to make any admissions or entertain any offers of a settlement.

More often than not, it is only after Court proceedings have started but before the claim reaches the stage of a final trial, the NHSLA makes concessions and offers and the claim is ultimately resolved. In these situations, the costs are inevitably many times higher than they would have been, or indeed should have been, had sensible attempts to resolve the claim been made prior to the commencement of Court proceedings.

I recently dealt with a case where prior to Court proceedings commencing, an offer was made on behalf of my client to the sum of £25,000. However, the offer was rejected and liability denied in full. Shortly after the exchange of expert reports, an offer was made on behalf of the NHSLA which resulted in the claim being settled for £17,500 (some 18 months after my client’s initial offer). The delay in settlement resulted in estimated additional costs of more than £100,000 – including legal fees, expert fees, Court fees, VAT, etc.

Yes, the costs were high, but what choice did my client have? She had to prepare her case on the assumption that it would ultimately be decided by a judge.

It is also worth pointing out that some cases would be avoided entirely if the hospitals and Trusts concerned were more open and honest about mistakes. Clinical negligence lawyers are often regarded as the option of ‘last resort’ by patients and their families ground down by NHS Trusts’ own complaints process and who are often still none the wiser on what went wrong and why.

An elderly female client of mine suffered a heart attack during a routine gastroscopy. After nearly three years, including two dispute resolution meetings, she is still in the dark and has been left with little option but to instruct a lawyer to try and get to the bottom of what happened to her.

Managing costs

There is already in place a robust assessment system to ensure that the NHSLA does not have to pay costs they consider to be ‘excessive’. Patients who receive compensation are only entitled to the payment of ‘reasonable’ legal costs. If agreement is not reached between the parties, these costs are assessed by a judge to determine what the NHSLA should pay.

Since 1 April 2013, the costs of pursuing claims are subject to much greater scrutiny from the Courts who are obliged to proactively manage the legal costs that the Parties to a dispute can incur. In every case, the Court will make a Costs Management Order recording the level of costs that the Court considers reasonable and proportionate. The Court must take into account the value of the claim. If the costs recorded in the Costs Management Order are exceeded then they are not recoverable from the other Party.

To sum up, patients who’ve suffered due to clinical negligence can be left physically disabled, mentally traumatised or unable to work through no fault of their own. In my view, it is only right and fair that they have access to justice and can pursue a claim for compensation to enable them to get the care and support they need.

Clinical negligence lawyers play an important role in helping to improve standards in medical practice and in ensuring that lessons are learned where entirely avoidable mistakes have occurred. If it is no longer viable for injured patients to have their potential claims properly investigated, then it is highly likely that more mistakes will happen and standards in medical practice will fall.

Clinical negligence lawyers will be keenly awaiting the launch of the Government’s formal consultation in the autumn to make their views heard. It remains to be seen if this will make a difference but if the Government is serious about reducing legal costs in clinical negligence cases, alternative options must be considered.

The Golden Age of Joint Lives Maintenance is Dead!

There is no doubt that Family law responds, more than other areas of law, to changes in society and high earners now earn significant salaries and there is a clear trend for couples to divorce later in life, to reflect a greater life expectancy and a greater expectancy of what quality of life they will enjoy in retirement.

Joint lives periodical payments has been the norm during my working life, with the onus on the payer – invariably the husband – to apply to terminate or reduce such an order if the wife were to remarry, cohabit, or find well-paid employment, to avoid crystal ball gazing. But of course that in itself creates uncertainty in both parties being able to plan their futures and leaves open the potential for a further round of litigation and significant costs, and capitalisation at a later date.

Section 25A (2) provides that it is the courts’ statutory duty when making a periodical payments order to consider:

Whether it would be appropriate to require those payments to be made or secured only for such term as would, in the opinion of the court, be sufficient to enable the party in whose favour the order is made to adjust without undue hardship for the termination of his or her financial dependence on the other party.”

The rationale which underpins Section 25A was properly set out by the Supreme Court in Miller v Miller/McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, where their Lordships stated that:

The goal the court is required to have in mind is that the parties’ mutual financial obligation should end as soon as the court considers just and reasonable.”

“The whole point of a divorce is to enable people whose lives were previously bound up with one another to disentangle those bonds and lead independent lives.”

By 2008 in the case of VB v JP [2008] EWHC 112 Fam, the court held:

In ordinary circumstances a wife has no right or expectation of continuing economic parity (sharing) unless and to the extent that consideration of her needs or compensation for RGD so requires. A clean break is to be encouraged wherever possible.”

Sometimes as practitioners we forget this very simple point, and having grown up in an era of joint lives maintenance we all too often forget the drive to achieve a clean break in anything other than larger money cases.

In L v L (Financial Remedy: Deferred Clean Break) [2011] EWHC 2207 Fam, it was held that the court has a positive duty to consider a term order, even when neither party is seeking it.

If there is uncertainty about the appropriate length of term, the court held in C v C (Financial Relief: Short Marriage) [1997] 2 FLR 26:

The proper course is to impose no term, but to leave the payer to seek the variation….. Gazing into the crystal ball does not give rise to a reasonable expectation.”

So what Is Income?

Income is easy for the average man in the street – it is what their pay slip shows.

However, I prefer Peter Duckworth’s definition:

In relation to the husband’s annual earnings/receipts from the Business, means the aggregate of all (a) income received by him, whether in the nature of salary, bonuses, dividends, compensation, pension scheme contributions, or the like, and (b) benefits in kind, including car allowances, P11D benefits, EBT schemes, share incentive schemes or similar, less any tax and National Insurance contributions (or the equivalent in another jurisdiction) deducted therefrom in the tax year in question.”

If we are not considering the above, then we may well be missing something.

Please remember in terms of EBTs there are deferred Tax and NI issues that need to be addressed if treated as income that can support periodical payments.

As with all periodical payments cases there are two questions –

  1. How much?
  2. How long?

Let me start with duration.   Gone are the days where a wife would simply receive periodical payments for life and we would glibly advise the husband that the wife would remarry and periodical payments would come to an end.

I therefore want to consider the questions of “needs”, “sharing”, length of periodical payments, how we treat bonuses and quantum.

Needs and Sharing

R v R (Financial Remedies: Needs and Practicalities) [2013] 1FLR 120 – Coleridge J

Coleridge J reminds us that cases will be dealt with on the basis of needs and practicalities.

JS v L (Financial Remedies: Pre-acquired assets, needs)[2013] 1FLR 300 – King, J “Needs Trumps Everything”

Paragraph 85 – “there is no doubt that the husband came into the marriage with substantial assets, which assets are capable of being the subject of forceful arguments in favour of their being excluded as non-matrimonial property. In my judgment, however, … those assets are required in order to satisfy both the immediate and long-term needs of the wife and children.”

Duration

MacFarlane v. MacFarlane 20th June [2009]

This was an 18 year marriage to the date of separation, with three children the youngest of whom was 12. Mr MacFarlane was an accountant with Deloittes. Capital had been divided equally between the parties and in 2002 at the time of the original hearing the wife had been awarded periodical payments on a joint lives basis of £250,000 per annum.

After various appeals the original award was reinstated by the House of Lords (as was) in 2006.

In 2007 the wife applied for a further increase in periodical payments. At the time of this hearing the wife had more capital than the Husband (£3.86 million as opposed to the Husband’s £3.65 million), but the Husband had slightly more pension. She had an income of £22,000 net per annum, the Husband had an income of between £720,000 – £770,000 net per annum and hoped to retire at the age of 55. He had by now remarried a partner in Deloittes.

The court increased her periodical payments by £100,000 net, i.e. from £250,000 to £350,000 net. However, the Court anticipates a termination upon former Husband’s retirement, anticipated to be 2015 but that terms is extendable, and the Court imposed a sliding scale of 40% up to £750,000, 20% up to £1 million and 10% over £1 million.

In Murphy v Murphy [2014] EWHC 2263 , the wife was 32 and Husband, 35. They met in 2004, cohabited from 2005, and married in 2007. The marriage broke down 6 years later in 2013, at which time they had twins aged 3.

At the FDR the majority of issues were resolved in terms of capital and pensions, but a dispute remained as to whether spousal maintenance should be stepped down in the near future and should be subject to a term order.

The wife at this time was a full-time carer, but had held well-paid employment before that.   She had planned to train as a teacher, but that had not materialised and she felt it was no longer viable, and, as such, she was opposed to any stepping down of maintenance.

The Husband had been working in Hong Kong, but had now returned to London and faced a higher tax bill, and raised issues regarding variation of the level of maintenance he was paying.

The court took the view that to step down maintenance, i.e. to guestimate what the wife could or would be earning in 3 years’ time was “totally speculative”.

Holman, J. reminded us of Section 25A (2) MCA 1973, namely:

Where the court decides in such a case to make a periodical payments order in favour of a party to the marriage, the court shall in particular consider whether it would be appropriate to require those payments to be made….. only for such term as would, in the opinion of the court, be sufficient to enable the party on whose favour the order was made to adjust without undue hardship to the termination of his or her financial dependence on the other party.”

In the circumstances, despite the relatively short length of the marriage, the Judge declined to make a term order.

SS v NS (Spousal Maintenance) [2014] EWHC 1483 – Mr Justice Mostyn, this was a case where the wife was aged 39 and the Husband, 40.

The parties had lived together since 2002, married in 2007, had 3 children aged 11,9 & 7, all privately educated.   They separated in May 2013.   The Husband was in a new relationship.

The Husband was a banker and the wife was the primary carer for the children.

They had assets of broadly £3.29 million.

The Husband had a number of unvested shares, which on receipt would be taxed as income.   Counsel for the wife included the unvested shares, but this was criticised by the Husband.

Mostyn, J said:

“In my judgement there would have to be special features present before money earned, but which is deferred in collection and conditional on performance, is excluded from the divisible pool.”

Mostyn, J. gave the following guidance:

a.        Spousal maintenance is properly made where the evidence shows that choices made during the marriage had generated hard future needs on the part of the Claimant. In this case the duration of the marriage and the children were pivotal factors.

  1. An award should only be made by reference to needs, save in exceptional circumstances where it can be said that the sharing or compensation principle applies.
  2. Where the needs in question are not causally connected to the marriage, the award should generally be aimed at alleviating significant hardship.
  3. In every case the court must consider a termination of spousal maintenance for the transition to independence as soon as it is just and reasonable. A term should be considered unless the payee would be unable to adjust without undue hardship to the ending of payments.   A degree of hardship in making the transition to independence is acceptable.
  4. If the choice between an extendable term and a joint lives order is finely balanced, the statutory steer should militate in favour of the former.
  5. The marital standard of living is relevant to the quantum of spousal maintenance, but is not decisive.
  6. The essential task of a Judge is not merely to examine each individual item in the budget, but to stand back and look at the global total and ask if it is a fair and proportionate outcome.
  7. Where the Respondent’s income comprises a base salary and a discretionary bonus the Claimant’s award may be equivalently partitioned, with needs of strict necessity being met from the base salary and additional discretionary items being met from the bonus on a capped percentage basis
  8. There is no criterion of exceptionality on an application to extend a term order. On such an application an examination should be made of whether the implicit premise of the original order of the ability of the payee to achieve independence had been impossible to achieve and if so, why?
  9. On an application to discharge a joint lives order an examination should be made of the original assumption that it was just too difficult to predict eventual independence.
  10. If the choice between extendable and non-extendable term is finely balanced the decision should normally be in favour of the economically weaker party.

In this case the wife was awarded £30,000 per annum index-linked RPI and received a capped percentage of 20% of the Husband future bonuses.   The bonus share was non-extendable, but the base spousal maintenance had an extendable term which expired when the youngest child reached 18 (in just over 10 years’ time).

Beware Extendable Term Maintenance

Yates v Yates [2012] EWCA Civ. 532

The parties entered into a 3 year term without a Section 28 (1A) bar.

The wife’s subsequent application to extend and capitalise periodical payments resulted in the husband having to pay a lump sum of £398,000 – the equivalent of 12 years further periodical payments.

In Chiva v Chiva [2014] EWCA Civ. 1558, capital had been shared equally.

This was wife’s appeal against a periodical payments order of £700 per month for a 2 year term where the parties were in their mid-30s with a 3 year old daughter.   The husband was an IP lawyer and the wife an Actuary. (Pause There) Prior to the birth of the parties’ child the wife had earned more than he had, but was now only working part-time, earning £32,300 to his £94,000.

The wife was unsuccessful on appeal, the court taking the view that the wife could increase her 7 days to 10 days per month over a period of 2 years, and if necessary she could apply to extend the term because there was no Section 28 (1A) bar.

In Wright v Wright [2015] EWCA Civ. 201, the Husband was an equine surgeon earning £150,000 per annum, and was required by a 2008 order to pay joint lives maintenance of £33,200 to his wife, plus child maintenance and school fees.

District Judge Cushing in her Judgment had said that the wife would be expected within the following 2 years to begin making a working contribution towards her own household expenditure. Indeed the Judge had said:

There is a general expectation in these courts that once a child is in Year 2 most mothers can consider part-time work consistent with her obligation to the children. By September 2009/10 the wife should be able to work. She will be 46 or 47 years old. I do not anticipate her having a significant earning capacity, nor would it be reasonable to expect her to muck out stables for the minimum wage. However, she should make some financial contribution.”

Upon the husband’s application to vary, Her Honour Judge Lyn Roberts reduced the spousal maintenance gradually over 6 years, at the conclusion of which payments would cease.

She notably commented that wife had made “..no effort to get a job without good reason”, and that a working mother would be “…a good role model for the children”, and “..vast numbers of women with children just get on with it” and this wife should have been doing so as well.

The Court of Appeal refused the wife’s oral application for permission to appeal saying there was no prospect of a successful challenge to the Judgment. It was open to the wife to make a further application if despite her best efforts she failed to produce a significant financial contribution both at the present and for the future, but the onus henceforward would be on her. (Lord Pitchford)

Be aware that this case cannot be cited as an authority.

With reference to quantum

In Vaughan v Vaughan [2007] EWCA Civ. 1085, the Court of Appeal held there was no authority and no foundation, even in principle, for equal sharing of future income.

In Nightingale v Turner [2015], a stay-at-home husband says £50,000 per annum on divorce is unreasonable.

The wife is a “high-flying” accountant and at the start of proceedings was 41, with a salary of £420,000 per annum and was a Partner at PwC.

She was the bread-winner, her husband the homemaker – a traditional role reversal.

The couple were married for 7 years, but had cohabited for 10 years, and had one child.

The Judge felt it was reasonable to expect the husband to go back to work full time and he should be able to earn £36,000 per annum, which was discounted against maintenance.   The husband seeks to argue that he should remain a house-husband.

The husband felt there was gender-bias and is challenging the order, seeking a stay in the sale of the family home and an increase of periodical payments by 50%.

In effect the husband simply argues that if the roles had been reversed his periodical payments would have been generously assessed.

A date for appeal is to be fixed.

So where does that leave bonuses?

In P v P [2013] – Eleanor King, 20 December 2013, the court said that when ordering maintenance payments following divorce in a case where Husband’s income comprised salary and substantial bonus, the proper approach was to make an order which met the wife’s basic needs out of salary and then to use a percentage of the bonus to top-up that figure. However, it was necessary to set a cap upon the total amount payable from the bonus to avoid the wife receiving substantially more than was appropriate.

In H v W [2014[ EWHC 4105 (Fam), Mrs Justice Eleanor King, 20 December 2013, placed a cap upon Husband’s bonus so rather than having a percentage of his bonus reducing over a period of time, she placed a cap on the amount of bonus that was capable of being shared. In this case £20,000 per annum.

In SS v NS [2014] EWHC 4183 Fam, Mostyn, J. gave his views on an obiter basis, and said:

Where the Respondent’s income comprises a base salary and discretionary bonus, the Claimant’s support may be equivalently partitioned with needs/necessity being met from the base salary and additional discretionary items being met from the bonus on a capped percentage basis.”

Following on from the indications by King, J. in H v W (Cap on wife’s share of bonus payments) [2013] EWHC 4105, and Roberts, J. in B v B [2014] EWHC 4545 Fam, although Mostyn, J. stresses not what is necessarily required in all cases, but rather:

“…a matter of balance and degree.”

In conclusion, the title to this article is that the golden age of joint lives maintenance is dead. That is not necessarily so and perhaps in more modest asset cases joint lives maintenance remains the answer because it avoids the issue of “crystal ball gazing”; but in larger money cases I am comfortable with the title of the article.

In many ways it reflects changing attitudes and a pre-White era when a wife would seldom receive more than 25% of capital but have the security of joint lives maintenance.   In an era of 50%-50% why do we have a need for joint lives maintenance in larger money cases.

Perhaps in view of the guidance in SS v NS we now need to consider advising our clients with some caution.

But is that really the case? The Matrimonial Causes Act is 42 years old and I take you back to the start of my article –

Section 25A (2) provides that it is the court’s statutory duty when making a periodical payments or order to consider –

Whether it would be appropriate to require those payments to be made to secured only for such term as would, in the opinion of the court, be sufficient to enable the party in whose favour the order is made to adjust without undue hardship for the termination of his or her financial dependent on the other party.”

…… So what has changed?

Investigatory Privilege

Introduction

The Commercial Court delivered judgment in the case of Quinn v Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited and Kieran Wallace[1] on 19 May 2015, confirming that the scope of litigation privilege extends not only to documents created for the dominant purpose of anticipated litigation, but also to documents created in contemplation of a criminal or regulatory investigation.

The judgment has significant implications for businesses engaged in a regulatory process, as it provides them with an opportunity to immediately engage with their lawyers on a privileged and confidential basis. It also highlights that the assistance of lawyers at an early stage of an investigation can have substantial benefits for an organisation, both in the regulatory process itself and in any future civil action.

The rationale for privilege

In general, a witness will be bound to answer all relevant questions put to him, and will be held to be in contempt of court if he refuses to do so; however, the law recognises that there are a number of instances in which a person enjoys a privilege from being compelled to answer a question or produce a document.

The law of privilege seeks to balance, on the one hand, the administration of justice and the interest in ensuring that all relevant evidence is before the courts, and on the other, the protection of the relationship between lawyer and client which relies to a degree on confidentiality. The reasoning behind the existence of legal professional privilege is that of encouraging a client to make full and frank disclosure of all relevant facts in relation to his case to his lawyer, in confidence that such disclosures will not be revealed without the client’s consent.

Legal professional privilege can be divided into two basic categories: “legal advice privilege” and “litigation privilege”. Broadly speaking, legal advice privilege protects a person from producing confidential communications made between him and his lawyer for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice. In order to establish legal advice privilege, it must be shown that the document or information sought to be disclosed consists of a confidential communication made in the course of a professional legal relationship, for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice. It should be noted that not all communications between a solicitor and client are privileged, only those made for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice, and those made in confidence. This privilege will apply regardless of whether litigation is contemplated or not.

Litigation privilege, on the other hand, applies to confidential communications between a client and his lawyer or a third party such as a witness or expert, the dominant purpose of which is to prepare for anticipated litigation. A document will be privileged if the dominant purpose for its creation is contemplated or reasonably apprehended litigation. The test as to the dominant purpose of the creation of the document is an objective one, and it will not be sufficient that the document was created for more than one equal purposes, one of which is contemplated litigation.

It should be noted that no privilege is absolute; as the doctrine has its roots in public policy, exceptions may be made in circumstances where the balance of the public interest in disclosing the document or communication outweighs the maintenance of the privilege. In particular, privilege will not apply to communications made in furtherance of crime or fraud. The courts have held that the purpose of legal professional privilege is “to aid the administration of justice, not to impede it[2].

Expansion of the doctrine of privilege

The Quinn v Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited and Kieran Wallace case concerned an application for further and better discovery; the defendants asserted privilege over a number of disputed documents and sought to establish that the dominant purpose for the creation of the documents was the contemplation of further litigation, or for the purpose of two investigations, one by the Financial Regulator, and one by the Director of Corporate Enforcement.

Previous caselaw has confirmed that privilege can be claimed by a person whose conduct is under examination by a tribunal of inquiry, on the basis that although such a tribunal may not be involved in the administration of justice, it does have an adjudicatory function, and any report it may produce has the potential to have serious and damaging effects for the persons called before it. In the case of Ahern v Mahon[3], the plaintiff was held to be entitled to claim litigation privilege in respect of communications between him and his legal advisors and experts retained by him for the purposes of the inquiry proceedings. As a person whose conduct was under examination by the tribunal of inquiry, the plaintiff was held to be entitled to certain fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to one’s good name, the right to fair procedures, and the right to natural and constitutional justice. Judge Kelly held that a person appearing before a tribunal of inquiry and to whom such fundamental constitutional rights apply to is to be regarded as being in the same position as a party to High Court litigation, and not a mere witness, from the point of view of legal professional privilege.

Judge McGovern in the Quinn judgment accepted the first defendant’s submission that it was entitled to assert investigatory privilege or regulatory privilege in respect of any documents created for the dominant purpose of engaging with the regulatory and investigative processes in question. Judge McGovern cautioned that the privilege did not extend to all documents created after the date on which the defendant became aware of the investigations, but only those documents created for the dominant purpose of engaging with those investigation processes.

The logic behind the application of privilege is the principle that a person must be able to consult his lawyer in confidence, and be sure that what he tells his lawyer in confidence will never be revealed without his consent. It has been described as “much more than an ordinary rule of evidence, limited in its application to the facts of a particular case. It is a fundamental condition on which the administration of justice as a whole rests[4]. The labelling of a tribunal of inquiry as inquisitorial rather than adversarial will not be determinative, and the central issue will be one of fairness.

The Quinn judgment provides further clarity on the scope of documents that will attract privilege in the context of inquiries and investigations, and clearly establishes the principle of investigatory/regulatory privilege.

 

This briefing is correct as at 13 July 2015.

Disclaimer

This information is for guidance purposes only. It does not constitute legal or professional advice. Professional or legal advice should be obtained before taking or refraining from any action as a result of the contents of this publication. No liability is accepted by Eversheds for any action taken in reliance on the information contained herein. Any and all information is subject to change. Eversheds is not responsible for the contents of any other website or third party material which can be accessed through this website.

Eversheds is an Irish partnership and a member firm of the Eversheds International network of firms affiliated with Eversheds International Limited, an English company limited by guarantee. Member firms of Eversheds International are independent firms and members of Eversheds International Limited, but have no authority to obligate or bind Eversheds International Limited or one another vis-à-vis third parties. Neither Eversheds International Limited nor any of its member firms have any liability for each other’s acts or omissions.

[1] [2015] IEHC 315

[2] Gallagher v Stanley [1998] 2IR 267, 271.

[3] [2008] IEHC 119

[4] Lord Taylor in R. v. Derby Magistrates Court Ex parte B [1996] 1 A.C. 487, cited with approval in Duncan v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison [1997] 1 I.R. 558

International Arbitration in Sport: Why The Pechstein Case Could Throw The Court Of Arbitration For Sport Into Disarray

1    INTRODUCTION

1.1    The benefits of arbitration (as opposed to the Court system) in resolving sporting disputes have long been recognised by those concerned with the regulation and governance of sport.  The specialised expertise of sports arbitrators, the speed, confidentiality and relative cost efficiency with which arbitral panels can deliver decisions are all attractive in an industry that requires disputes to be decided quickly and at short notice .  Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of sport governing bodies therefore include an agreement to arbitrate sporting disputes in their Rules as a pre-condition to participation in the sport.

1.2    Since its inception, three years after the then IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch proposed the creation of a “supreme court of world sport”, the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), has gained the trust of most sports as an independent and consistent forum for the resolution of disputes. Unsurprisingly, most sports have now adopted the CAS as the final appellate forum (save in limited circumstances) once the sports’ own internal dispute resolution procedures have been exhausted.

1.3    Against that backdrop, the ongoing proceedings concerning Ms Paula Pechstein’s dispute with the International Skating Union (ISU) in connection with the two year ban from competition imposed by the ISU Disciplinary Commission (ISUDC) in 2009 for doping offences are relevant not just to the immediate issue of CAS’ jurisdiction, but also to the wider issue of how disputes are best resolved in the modern sporting context.

2    THE PECHSTEIN PROCEEDINGS

2.1    The story began in February 2009 when blood samples were taken from Ms. Pechstein as part of the ISU’s blood testing programme  on the eve of the ISU World Allround Speed Skating Championships in Hamar.  These samples were compared with Ms. Pechstein’s apparent blood profile based on information that the ISU had gathered over a number of years from blood samples taken from her as part of its anti-doping programme.  That comparison gave rise to suspicious findings because of an abnormal increase in reticulocytes (immature red blood cells) which were potentially indicative of blood doping.

2.2    On 5 March 2009, the ISU filed a complaint with the ISUDC accusing Ms. Pechstein of blood doping offences. Following a hearing in Berne, the ISUDC found Ms. Pechstein guilty of an ‘Anti-Doping Violation’ and disqualified her from competing for two years.  Notably, this was in spite of the fact that no Prohibited Substances had ever been identified in any of Ms. Pechstein’s samples.  Her case was therefore determined on circumstantial rather than any actual evidence of doping.

2.3    Ms. Pechstein subsequently appealed to the CAS pursuant to Article 24 and Article 25 of the ISU Constitution and Rule 13.2.1 and 13.6 of the ISU Anti-Doping Rules. The Final Arbitral Award was published on 25 November 2009, dismissing Ms. Pechstein’s appeal on the grounds that “illicit manipulation of her own blood” remained the “only reasonable alternative source of such abnormal values”.

2.4    Many challenges to doping bans end at that point with the CAS typically being seen, as Mr. Samaranch had originally envisaged, as the ultimate arbiter of sporting disputes.   However, Ms. Pechstein went further and appealed to the Swiss Federal Tribunal on a number of grounds. On 10 February 2010, applying the test contained within Article 190(2)(a)-(e) of the Swiss Private International Law Act strictly, the Swiss Federal Tribunal dismissed the appeal.

2.5    There was then a second appeal to the Swiss Federal Tribunal in which Ms. Pechstein argued that a novel scientific method of diagnosing hereditary spherocytosis (which could explain the blood test abnormalities) had been developed that was not available to the CAS at the time of the underlying arbitration. The Swiss Federal Tribunal again rejected Ms. Pechstein’s appeal.

2.6    Dissatisfied with the CAS and Swiss Federal Tribunal’s decisions, Ms. Pechstein issued a damages claim for €4 million in her local German Regional Court in Munich (Landesgericht), alongside a complaint to the European Court of Human Rights .

2.7    On 26 February 2014, the Landesgericht  held both that it was seized of jurisdiction and that the arbitration agreement between the ISU and Ms. Pechstein was invalid, as Ms. Pechstein was forced to sign the agreement to arbitrate as a precondition of participating in her sport.  The Landesgericht considered this a breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  However, despite this finding, it held that the principle of res judicata meant that the CAS Final Arbitral Award was enforceable pursuant to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards.  The CAS award and the sanctions imposed on Ms. Pechstein, therefore, stood, despite the fact that the basis for it was, in the Landesgericht’s eyes, illegitimate.

2.8    Having now gained some traction in her efforts to prove her innocence and challenge the sanctions imposed on her, Ms. Pechstein appealed to the Higher Regional Court of Munich (Oberlandesgericht). On 15 January 2015 , overturning the decision of the Landesgericht, it held that:

(a)    The arbitration agreement between Ms. Pechstein and the ISU was invalid as it was contrary to mandatory German anti-trust law . Namely, the ISU’s insistence upon the agreement to arbitrate as a precondition of competing constituted an abuse of a dominant position.  This was on the basis that the constitution of the International Council for Arbitration in Sport (ICAS) that selected the closed list of arbitrators and also appointed the President of the Appeals Arbitration Division, who in turn was responsible for appointing the chair for each CAS panel, was contrary to German anti-trust law.  ICAS comprises 20 members, of which 12 were nominated by the International Olympic Committee, and only 1/5 were nominated with the athletes’ interests in mind;

(b)    Accordingly, the CAS decision (which was mandated by the invalid arbitration agreement) was unlawful; and

(c)    The Landesgericht was wrong to find that the principles of res judicata and the New York Convention meant that the decision of the CAS was valid. The Oberlandesgericht considered that the breach of anti-trust law was contrary to public policy , and pursuant to the exclusion contained within Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, the CAS decision was not binding.

2.9    To bring matters up-to-date, the current picture is that the ISU announced on 9 July 2015 that it had filed an appeal against the Oberlandesgericht’s decision to the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof).  On 14 July 2015, FIFPro, the football players’ federation, announced that it will financially support Ms. Pechstein in the defence of the ISU’s appeal, which is now pending.

3    ANALYSIS

3.1    One of the most striking aspects of the German Court’s decisions to date has been their willingness to entertain a challenge to CAS’ jurisdiction in spite of Ms. Pechstein’s failure to raise her jurisdictional challenge at any point prior to issuing proceedings before the German Courts.  There was nothing preventing Ms Pechstein from raising a fundamental challenge to her arbitration agreement with the ISU and CAS’ jurisdiction under it at the outset of her case.  Ms. Pechstein did not do so; indeed, she willingly submitted to the jurisdiction of the CAS.

3.2    Given that under section 73 of the Arbitration Act of 1996, a jurisdictional challenge must be made as the first step before a participant takes any substantive steps in the arbitration, the position reached by the German Courts is, ostensibly, directly opposed to the position under English law.

3.3    Either way, if upheld, the German Court’s decision appears to open up the possibility of athletes ‘forum shopping’ for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms after receiving an unfavourable judgment .  It remains to be seen whether the Bundesgerichtshof will address the point.

3.4    With the Bundesgerichtshof yet to opine on this and the other issues at stake, there may yet be more twists and turns in this saga.  Whatever the ultimate outcome, it is impossible for CAS to ignore the challenges made and the various decisions of the German courts.

3.5    Whilst some commentators have played down the likely impact of the case, given the long standing jurisprudence of the CAS (and the Swiss Courts endorsement of its role), the significance of the German Court’s decisions is clearly on CAS’ radar, with it stating in a press release:

“If, like in the Pechstein/ISU case, arbitration agreements were to be considered as invalid by state courts, even when not challenged at any stage during the arbitration, then the basic principles of international arbitration would be compromised” .

3.6    It is easy to see that the Pechstein case could have wide ranging implications for sporting arbitration agreements. Specifically, regardless of the Bundesgerichtshof’s view of the merits of Ms. Pechstein’s case, if it upholds the Oberlandesgericht’s decision that it has the jurisdiction to interfere with CAS’ decision, then it both paves the way for courts in other jurisdictions to find similarly in respect of their national athletes, and opens the door to potential damages claims against CAS by athletes who have been on the receiving end of sanctions.

3.7    Furthermore, the fact that FIFPro (and other donors) have agreed to fund Ms. Pechstein’s defence of the ICU appeal suggests that there are a number of interested stakeholders in the sports industry waiting in the wings,  hoping that her challenge to CAS’ jurisdiction will succeed.

3.8    The statement published by FIFPro on 14 July 2015 that…
“Every athlete as a citizen and worker has the right to a fair process and to be judged in an independent and impartial court. The decisions of the regional courts in Germany in Claudia Pechstein’s case have confirmed that this right was not duly granted by CAS at the time of her anti-doping case.”

“FIFPro is firmly of the view that also today CAS does not provide footballers and other athletes with a structure and process that is fair to the athletes”.

…sounds as a warning to CAS that Ms. Pechstein and the German Courts are not alone in their belief that the constitution of the arbitral panels (and in this case CAS) are weighted in favour of governing bodies to the disadvantage of individual athletes.

3.9    Admittedly, the CAS has not stood still since 2009, and there have been amendments to the constitution of the ICAS and individual CAS arbitral panels.  It is only natural that modifications will be necessary to the structure and function of a body established over 30 years ago, and the authors believe that it is critical for the integrity of international sport to be able to call upon a dedicated and unified appellate body to deliver consistent decisions.  Otherwise, the spectre of a possible divergence in the application of and respect for fundamental sporting principles throughout the world arises.  Clearly, therefore, CAS’ attempts to address the concerns raised and reform itself are to be welcomed.

3.10    Like the majority of commentators, the authors therefore hope for a reformed CAS capable of serving the modern sporting context, not for its abolition.  However, the sports industry does not speak with one voice on this issue, as reflected in FIFPro’s statement that:

“Even after CAS’ structural reform, the composition of ICAS, the appointment of arbitrators and chairmen do not provide athletes with equal representation of arbitrators and independence of the tribunal. Other concerns such as procedural cost and the application of Swiss law to conflicts between EU-based parties have been criticized before .”

3.11    Whilst the decision of the Bundesgerichtshof is eagerly awaited by those operating in the sports sector, it appears that the legal challenges to CAS’s right to act as ‘the supreme court of world sport’ are unlikely to subside even if the Bundesgerichtshof overturns the Oberlandesgericht.

The Sanctions’ Effect and New Russian Law. Where Will the CIS Related Disputes be Heard in the Future?

It isn’t a secret that over the past 10 – 15 years, the LCIA and other major arbitral institutions in Europe including ICC, SCC and Swiss Chamber of Commerce have been hearing and continue to hear an increasing number of disputes originating in Russia and other CIS countries. Now over a year passed since the US and the European sanctions hit the Russian economy. In this article we are going to consider an impact which the sanctions are having already and are likely to have in the future on the resolution of international disputes involving the Russian parties. We are going to try and take into account as many factors as possible, including some of the recent changes in Russian law.

Some of the economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the EU and the United States apply to listed individuals, while the others concern certain sectors of the economy. The scope of the sanctions is quite wide. The sector sanctions cover arms and military equipment, energy and finance, putting a pressure on the Russian corporate entities operating in these sectors in different ways. For example, some of the biggest Russian companies, such as Gazprombank, Gazpromneft, Rosneft and many others don’t have access to the European and the US capital markets, cannot arrange for loans, etc. Sanctions concerning individuals are aimed at restricting their ability to travel and at freezing their assets. The sanctions are being under a constant review with new measures being added and more individuals being included into the sanctions lists[1].

The sanctions are obviously having an impact on the individuals and the corporate entities which they were aimed at targeting. However they are also having some less obvious effects on other individuals and companies, including those in the legal services. The law firms based in Europe and in the US need to make sure that in rendering legal support in contentious and non-contentious matters they are not facilitating any transactions prohibited by the sanctions. Many law firms in Europe and in the US have now developed internal control systems in relation to the sanctions. These systems are used whenever it comes to instructions from the Russian clients. It is not uncommon these days for an English or a US law firm to refuse representing a Russian client in a potential dispute or in connection with a non-contentious matter. There is a concern that the arbitrators may be refusing to act in a similar way. Even if this will not be the case it is believed there is a danger that the arbitrators’ impartiality and independence might get affected. Apart from this there are other issues arising out of sanctions in the context of international arbitration and the use of the European arbitral institutions:

  • if a party to the proceedings is one of the listed individuals or entities, then before proceeding with filing a request for arbitration, such party would have to apply for a permission to transfer funds to the relevant arbitration institution;

 

  • it might be difficult for the witnesses involved to travel to the venue, i.e. the place of a hearing; the witnesses may also experience difficulties in meeting their legal advisers in their office based in Europe;

 

  • it might be difficult to enforce an award in Russia because it might be seen as contravening the public policy. Generally it is not very uncommon for the Russian courts to refuse enforcement based on the public policy argument. For example, in the case of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation v OJSC Amur (case no. A73-1288/2009) the Supreme Commercial Court held that the damages exceeding 60% of the contract price were disproportionately high and as the result the award was refused enforcement. It might be the case that with sanctions related arbitral awards the public policy ground will be invoked more often, making it impossible to enforce the awards.

 

  • It might also be difficult to enforce it in other jurisdictions covered by the sanctions, as the enforcement itself might trigger one of the restrictions imposed by sanctions.

The above listed issues are just some examples of possible difficulties which are being experienced or considered by the Russian and international legal community involved in resolution of the Russia related disputes.

As the result, a number of commentators both in Russia and in Europe suggested that it might be a shift towards arbitral institutions based outside of Europe for resolution of the disputes involving the Russian parties. These alternative institutions may include Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) and Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC).

Whilst the alternatives are out there, it is unlikely that the Russian disputes will all move from the LCIA and other European institutions to SIAC, HIAC or other Asian institutions. Over the past twenty years or so, the Russian parties have been heavily relying on English law in quite a lot of transactions, including M&A, finance, general commercial agreements for sale of goods and services, distribution agreements, etc. As for the dispute resolution methods, international arbitration under the Rules of major European arbitral institutions was a popular choice. The disputes arising out of the contracts which had already been entered into in the past will obviously continue to be heard as per a relevant arbitration agreement between the parties.

As for the current transactions, it would probably be fair to say that the Russian in-house lawyers do think twice before inserting the LCIA, the ICC, the SCC arbitration clauses or the arbitration clauses of other arbitral institutions based in Europe. However the substantive law often stays English. Therefore even if the chosen seat is in Hong Kong or in Singapore and even if the chosen arbitral rules are those of SIAC or the HKIAC, the legal representatives will still have to include the English lawyers as well. Also for a client based in Moscow or in St Petersburgh or in other cities within the European part of Russia having to travel to Hong Kong or Singapore might not be convenient and cost effective. Last but not least there is simply a custom. A lot of lawyers in Russia have long established relationships with the partners of the law firms in London and other European cities. They had been working together for decades now. Whether all these factors will actually outweigh the difficulties associated with the sanctions remains to be seen.

Apart from the arbitral institutions in Asia, one should not forget about the Russian arbitration institutions. The oldest and probably the best-known one is the International Commercial Arbitration Court for Russian Chamber of Commerce, however it is not the only one. In April 2013 members of the Russian and international legal community dealing with the Russian related disputes founded a Russian Arbitration Association (the “RAA”). The association acts as an appointing authority and/or administers the disputes under the UNCTIRAL Rules 2010. The association’s members include some of the World’s top legal professionals in the area of international arbitration. Although the association is very young, it is very active and is becoming more and more popular quite quickly. There is a common understanding that in part, a success of the Russian arbitration institutions, including the RAA will depend on how often Russian law is used in international transactions.

Recently several attempts have been undertaken to make Russian law more attractive in international context. In particular, the Federal Law No. 42-FZ dated 8 March 2015 (‘Law No. 42-FZ’) introduced a number of important changes into Russian corporate law, which became effective as of 1 June 2015. Most importantly for the M&A transactions, where English law is often used, the new provisions were introduced in connection with warranties and indemnities. New section 431.2 of the Civil Code now provides a basis for claiming damages for misrepresentations. Before the claimant was most likely to rely on section 179 of the Civil Code, which allowed to claim damages for misrepresentation but only in conjunction with a claim to declare the whole transaction void. For obvious reasons, the claimant is not necessarily interested in setting the transaction aside. Instead, the claimant may wish to simply recover the losses sustained as the result of a misrepresentation. Before 1 June 2015 this could be very difficult or even impossible to achieve under the Russian. Now it is possible. It would be fair to say that the change introduced by section 431.2 is quite a significant development.

New section 406.1 of the Civil Code, which also became effective as of 1 June 2015, is very similar to what is understood as “indemnity” under the English law. Such term was not recognized before under the Russian law, the closest concept was that of an “insurance” which is very different. This change may also be regarded as a significant improvement in the context of Russian M&A law.

Needless to say, these are the new provisions and there are arguments amongst the Russian practitioners about possible interpretation of some aspects of these provisions. For example, some concerns have been expressed in connection with a wording of a new s. 406.1, which seems to suggest that parties may need to include at least a maximum amount of the indemnity into their agreement, which might be a difficult thing to do in reality. In time the courts’ practice in connection with these new provisions will develop giving the business parties concerned more certainty and more confidence.

The new sections in the Civil Code are just some examples of changes in the Russian Civil Code, which have been reformed significantly. The changes were made also in the areas concerning Russian insolvency law, general contract law and guarantees. Apart from this, other changes are being considered in the Russian judicial system including in relation to international arbitration. It is too early to say how successful the implemented and the anticipated changes are going to be. However it is clear that that while the English law will continue to be used the Russian legislators and the Russian business community do feel under more pressure now to continue developing a national law so that it is easier to use in international context. The more successful the changes are the more significant will be the shift to Russian law and the Russian arbitral institutions. Right at this moment, the Asian institutions are definitely a good alternative but with its own practical limitations in place.

[1] – For further information on European sanctions please see Counsel Regulations 833/2014, 960/2014, 208/2014, 269/2014, 692/2014, 825/2014. For further information on the US Sanctions please see Executive Order 13662.

An Introduction to Resolving A Dispute Through an Expert Determination Process

Firstly, what is meant by an expert determination?

It is the process where the parties agree that a third party (the “Expert”) is appointed to answer particular questions / determine particular disputed items identified by the parties. It generally works best when there is a narrow set of clearly defined technical questions.

An expert determination is not the same as providing expert testimony to a court or a tribunal. Under English law, it is a process under contract that is intended to give the parties finality, save for fraud or manifest error, on disputed issues that are capable of being addressed by an expert.

It is not a process whereby the Expert becomes part of the dispute between the parties, even if one or both parties are disappointed in the outcome of the determination. It is important to remember that the Expert engaged is not an arbitrator, adjudicator, or an expert witness. He or she is not giving opinion evidence under court or tribunal processes.

What do the parties get from the expert determination?

  • A confidential, binding decision.
  • It allows the parties to appoint an expert who is familiar with the technical issues.
  • It generally results in a quicker decision when compared to the court / arbitration route. Note that even if the parties went to court, they may still need to engage an Expert, but in the capacity of an expert witness.
  • It can be flexible with the initial timetable agreed between the parties and the Expert.
  • It is a transparent process as both parties see all the information / correspondence provided to the Expert.
  • It can be less adversarial and may help the parties maintain a business relationship post dispute.
  • The Expert arrives at his / her decision, based upon his / her own knowledge, expertise and experience, taking into account the submissions made by the parties. This can be a great advantage, particularly when the issue is a technical one and the Expert has been carefully chosen due to their particular area of expertise.
  • Only in limited circumstances can the expert determination be challenged (e.g. fraud or manifest error).

Step 1: Identifying the Expert

The identification of the Expert may already be set down in the commercial agreement between the parties that contains the expert determination clause, but if this is not the case, there are a number of options for selecting an appropriate Expert.

The first option open to the parties may be to simply agree between them who might be suitably qualified. If the dispute is financial in nature, it may be that the company’s auditor can make the determination. In this situation, no further research is required on finding an appropriate expert. This may not, however, be acceptable to the parties if, for example, they are concerned about independence, in which case they will need to research an alternative expert.

Organisations exist that can provide recognised experts; e.g. if the parties wish to appoint an expert accountant they can approach the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (“ICAEW”) President’s Appointment Scheme to nominate one for them.

Be mindful, though, that if the parties allow an external body to nominate the Expert, such as the President’s Appointment Scheme, they lose control over the choice of Expert.

Alternatively, the parties can independently research and agree upon a person to act as the Expert, thereby retaining control over the selection process. There are organisations which maintain lists of experts who have had to go through an accreditation process. In the case of Experts in the accounting field these include:

  • The Academy of Experts;
  • The Expert Witness Institute; or
  • The ICAEW’s Register of Accredited Accountant Expert Witnesses.

In selecting an Expert from one of these or similar sources it will be important for the parties to understand the following:

  • Whether the external body nominates experts, as in the case of the ICAEW’s President’s Appointment Scheme; and
  • The selection process under which these experts become members of these organisations.

Once the parties have clarification on these issues, they can then consider whether a particular external body’s list contains a broad selection of highly qualified experts from which a suitable candidate may be selected.

It is also important to establish that the Expert does not have any vested interest in the outcome of the dispute, and is not in any way biased towards or against either party.

Step 2: Terms of Appointment

Once the Expert has been identified, the next step is to set the terms of the appointment. The main considerations specific to an expert determination are:

  • There should be a set of clear instructions, setting out the questions to be answered / disputed items to be determined.
  • Will the Expert provide an unreasoned or reasoned expert determination? The advantage of the former is that it will be quicker and cost less. The disadvantage is that the parties will not be privy to the reasons as to why the Expert arrived at his / her determination.
  • How the Expert’s fees will be split between the parties. Typically the Expert’s fees are shared equally between the parties.
  • Agreeing the timetable as part of the engagement terms, although there may also be provision for both parties to make requests to the Expert for the timetable to be altered subsequently.

The terms of engagement will make it clear that the Expert is required to make the decision / determination on the basis of material provided to him / her by the parties.

Step 3: The Process

There are no set rules, but the Academy of Experts has, for example, produced its “Rules for Expert Determination”, and these include guidelines on the timetable and process.

In all cases the agreed instructions should be followed. This has been the subject of a recent England & Wales Court of Appeal decision in Begum –v- Hossain [2015] EWCA Civ 717.

All correspondence with the Expert should be in writing. The process will normally be that each party submits their evidence in writing to the Expert by a prescribed date and the Expert then arranges for the evidence from one party to be exchanged with the other party.

The initial set of documentation is provided within an agreed number of days (as set out in the engagement terms) after the Expert’s engagement letter is signed. This initial documentation should summarise the nature of the dispute, the issues involved, the parties’ submissions in relation to those issues and, in financial disputes, the effect on the quantum of the amount or amounts claimed, together with appropriate supporting documentation.

The parties are then given an agreed number of days to provide a written response to the other’s submissions, indicating whether or not they agree with the other party, and if not in agreement, why this is the case.

In addition to the above, the Expert will have discretion to request written clarification or ask further questions of the parties on any matters contained in the written material received from them. Further queries are sent in writing to both parties simultaneously. It may also be the case that issues outside the Expert’s area of expertise get raised; for example, legal issues. In such instances, the Expert’s terms will normally allow him to seek advice from appropriately qualified third parties, the cost of which is generally borne by the parties.

Step 4: The Determination

Once the Expert has considered the submissions made by the parties and applied his / her expertise and experience, the determination is given. This is either with or without reasons.

Conclusion

In summary, if you consider that an expert determination is right for you, here are some tips for ensuring the process runs smoothly:

  • Choose the Expert carefully;
  • Ensure the instructions are clear;
  • Decide whether it is to be an unreasoned or reasoned determination; and finally
  • Ensure you comply with all the agreed procedures; remember the Expert makes a decision based upon his / her knowledge, expertise and experience, taking into account the submissions made by the parties.

Expert determination clauses are often written into agreements between parties where there may be scope for disagreement over technical issues. Under English law, exercising such clauses presents a pathway to achieve finality by way of a private process under contract, rather than have the disagreement examined in the public arena of the courts. It can also be a useful way to resolve disputes where the parties either choose or need to maintain an ongoing relationship once the dispute resolution process is over.

CJEU potentially opens the back door to court ordered anti-suit injunctions in the EU

Gazprom OAO [2015] Judgment in EUCJEU C-536/13

The ability of the English courts to restrain court proceedings in another Member State in breach of an arbitration agreement was curtailed, following the infamous decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Allianz SpA (formerly Riunione Adriatica di Sicurtà SpA) v West Tankers Inc, (The Front Comor) (Case C-185/07). Earlier this year, there were hopeful signs that this decision might be reviewed following the referral to the CJEU by the Lithuanian Supreme Court of similar questions arising in a dispute between Gazprom OAO and Lithuania. The CJEU[1]’s decision in that case was issued on 13 May 2015 and while it has declined to revisit The Front Comor, the CJEU has potentially opened up the back-door to court ordered, intra-EU anti-suit injunctions.

In the West Tankers case, the CJEU found that it was incompatible with the Brussels Regulation 44/2001 (the original Brussels Regulation) for a court of a Member State to restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings before the courts of another Member State on the ground that the proceedings would be in breach of an arbitration agreement, in circumstances where the proceedings brought in the other Member State were within the scope of the Brussels Regulation. This decision meant that an anti-suit injunction could not be granted to restrain proceedings within the scope of the original Brussels Regulation brought in another EU Member State in breach of an arbitration clause.

Since – and in part because of – the decision in West Tankers, the original Brussels Regulation has been replaced by Brussels Regulation 1215/2012 (the recast Brussels Regulation), which has applied since 10 January 2015.

It is against this background that a dispute arose between Gazprom OAO and Lithuania concerning the running of Lithuania’s main natural gas provider, in which both parties were shareholders. The Lithuanian Ministry of Energy initiated court proceedings in Lithuania. Gazprom subsequently commenced arbitration under the rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) in Sweden. Gazprom argued that the Ministry’s claims were in breach of an arbitration agreement contained in the shareholders’ agreement to which they were both parties. The tribunal in the SCC arbitration issued an award ordering Lithuania to withdraw certain of its court claims (subsequently referred to by the Lithuanian court as an anti-suit injunction), which Gazprom then sought to have recognised and enforced in the Lithuanian Court of Appeal. The court refused and Gazprom appealed to the Supreme Court of Lithuania, where Lithuania argued that, in light of West Tankers, the anti-suit injunction issued by the arbitral tribunal was contrary to the original Brussels Regulation.

The Supreme Court of Lithuania referred the matter to the CJEU, asking whether the court of a Member State could refuse to recognise and enforce an award containing an arbitral anti-suit injunction as being incompatible with the original Brussels Regulation.

Advocate General opines that West Tankers should be reconsidered

On 4 December 2014, Advocate-General Wathelet concluded that the original Brussels Regulation must be interpreted as not requiring the court of a Member State to refuse to recognise such an award (the conclusion); and (b) suggested, in the context of a discussion of the recast Brussels Regulation, that it is was possible that the CJEU might reconsider the approach taken in West Tankers, both in relation to the original and the recast Brussels Regulation (the suggestion).

The decision of the CJEU

The CJEU declined to follow the Advocate-General’s suggestion and has therefore avoided revisiting its earlier decision in West Tankers. Although it referred to West Tankers, the CJEU limited itself to considering the specific questions posed by the Lithuanian court. In this respect, the CJEU agreed with the Advocate General’s conclusion that the Brussels Regulation must be interpreted such that a Member State court is not required to refuse to recognise or enforce an arbitral award containing an anti-suit injunction.

In reaching this decision, the CJEU confirmed that arbitration is outside the scope of the original Brussels Regulation because the Regulation governs only conflicts of jurisdiction between courts of the Member States. The CJEU took the view that there was no such conflict in this case and no question of infringement of trust by the interference of the court of one Member State in the jurisdiction of the court of another Member State (the only court involved was the Lithuanian court).   The arbitral award did not deny the party restrained from obtaining judicial protection because, in any proceedings for recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award, that party could contest recognition and enforcement and the Lithuanian court would have to determine, on the basis of national procedural law and international law, whether or not the award should be recognised and enforced.

The CJEU therefore concluded that the original Brussels Regulation did not “preclud[e] a court of a Member State from recognising and enforcing, or from refusing to recognise and enforce, an arbitral award prohibiting a party from bringing certain claims before a court of that Member State, since that regulation does not govern recognition and enforcement, in a Member State, of an arbitral award issued by an arbitral tribunal in another Member State”.

Comment

The original Brussels Regulation is widely considered to have been a successful European instrument. However, there were concerns including in relation to the arbitration exception whose application in practice resulted in ambiguity about the boundaries between the jurisdiction of Member State courts to act in support of arbitration in accordance with national law and their jurisdiction to act under the Brussels Regulation.

The CJEU sought to address this ambiguity in the West Tankers case. Unfortunately, this decision has had the no doubt unintended but unfortunate consequence of opening the door for parties to act abusively by bringing substantive proceedings within the scope of the Brussels Regulation in the courts of the Member State most likely to find the arbitration clause invalid (so-called “Italian torpedo” tactics), and rendering the party wishing to uphold the arbitration agreement and other Member State courts, including the courts of the seat of the arbitration, powerless to prevent this. It also means that the courts of those other Member States will subsequently have to enforce any judgment on the merits given by the Member State court that heard the substantive claim in breach of the arbitration clause.

Recital 12 of the recast Brussels Regulation seeks to address this concern as it makes clear that the ruling by a court of one Member State on the effectiveness of an arbitration agreement is not subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement laid down in the recast Brussels Regulation. Following the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Gazprom OAO in particular in respect of the recast Brussels Regulation, it was hoped that the CJEU might strengthen the effect of Recital 12 and revisit the approach taken in The Front Comor. The CJEU has not done so.

While this might, at first glance, appear unsatisfactory for users of arbitration keen to quell the tide of the abusive Italian torpedo, the decision warrants closer review. The CJEU concluded that the original Brussels Regulation “does not govern recognition and enforcement, in a Member State, of an arbitral award issued by an arbitral tribunal in another Member State”. This at least suggests that the decision in Gazprom should be the same where the courts of more than one Member State are involved in the analysis. In other words, it is at least open to debate following this decision whether a party to an arbitration seated in one Member State could now obtain an arbitral award restraining a counterparty from continuing proceedings in another Member State which could then be recognised by the courts at the seat, effectively obtaining a court-ordered anti-suit injunction by the back door and circumventing the limitation imposed by West Tankers.

Alternatively and possibly avoiding the inevitable risks involved in recognition and enforcement proceedings (and the question whether such an injunction could ever be issued as an award), a party may seek the arbitral injunction in the form of a peremptory order. If the arbitration were London seated, at least, that order could then be enforced by court order under section 42 of the Arbitration Act 1996. In either case, the party concerned would then have the benefit of a court order preventing their arbitral counter-party from pursuing proceedings in breach of the arbitration agreement in the court of another Member State with equivalent effect to a standard court-issued anti-suit injunction.

 

[1] The Court of Justice of the European Union was formerly known as the European Court of Justice (ECJ).